Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 83 | Issue 4

Article 9

7-20-2018

Taking Away the Tightrope: Fixing the National
Flood Insurance Program Circus via Eminent
Domain
Alexander S. Mendelson

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Disaster Law Commons, Housing Law Commons,
Insurance Law Commons, and the Land Use Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Alexander S. Mendelson, Taking Away the Tightrope: Fixing the National Flood Insurance Program Circus via Eminent Domain, 83 Brook.
L. Rev. (2018).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol83/iss4/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

Taking Away the Tightrope
FIXING THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM CIRCUS VIA EMINENT DOMAIN
INTRODUCTION
Bringing thirteen named storms—with seven classified
as hurricanes, and four of those classified as major hurricanes—
“the 2017 Atlantic hurricane season [was] unusually active.”1 As
these major storms made landfall in the United States and the
Caribbean, they gripped the collective attention of the world and
once again reminded us of the devastating effects that natural
disasters can have on our communities.2 And while many of the
most severe physical effects are felt on the local level, the
profound damage caused by natural disasters is often felt on the
national level as well. The damage caused by hurricanes Harvey
and Irma alone is expected to cost a combined $290 billion—1.5
percent of the nation’s GDP.3 These tremendous estimates do not
include the damage caused by Hurricane Maria, whose floods
destroyed Puerto Rico’s electrical power infrastructure and left
the territory in “very, very, very perilous shape.”4
What’s more, disasters like these are not going away;
climate scientists have estimated that as many as thirteen
million homes in the United States are at risk of inundation by
the year 2100 due to the combined effects of sea level rise,

1 Maggie Astor, The 2017 Hurricane Season Really Is More Intense Than
Normal, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/19/
us/hurricanes-irma-harvey-maria.html [https://perma.cc/GX2U-NQAV].
2 See, e.g., Hurricane Maria Updates: In Puerto Rico, the Storm ‘Destroyed Us,’
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/us/hurricane-mariapuerto-rico.html [https://perma.cc/H6XY-88FG] [hereinafter Hurricane Maria Updates]
(providing frequent textual and photographic updates on the status of Puerto Rico in the
immediate aftermath of Hurricane Maria).
3 See AccuWeather Predicts Economic Cost of Harvey, Irma to Be $290 billion,
(Sept. 11, 2017, 11:06 AM), https://www.accuweather.com/en/weather-news/accu
weather-predicts-economic-cost-of-harvey-irma-to-be-290-billion/70002686
[perma.
cc/L7PU-GYUH].
4 See Hurricane Maria Updates, supra note 2.
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extreme weather, and climate change.5 Natural disasters like
those experienced in the 2017 hurricane season serve as a notso-gentle reminder that as individuals and as a society, we must
find ways to protect ourselves and each other from the inevitable
consequences of living in the natural world.6
This increased awareness of extreme weather comes at
an auspicious time, as Congress considers the reform and
reauthorization of the National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP).7 Created by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968,8
the federal program aims to reduce individual exposure to the
damage of potential flooding and to deter future development in
flood-prone areas.9 To those ends, the program makes flood
insurance “available to homeowners and businesses in
communities that have adopted and enforce appropriate
floodplain management measures.”10 By 2017, the NFIP was
comprised of approximately “5.1 million policies in more than
22,200 communities with approximately $1.25 trillion of
insurance in force.”11 Despite Congress’s good intentions in
enacting it, the NFIP remains a controversial program that in
many cases does more harm than good.12
Of the five million policyholders covered by the NFIP, a
significant number pay subsidized premiums that do not reflect
the actual risk of flooding that property owners face.13 Subsidies
5 See Lucas Eastman, Flood, Rebuild, Repeat: The Need for Flood Insurance
Reforms, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL: NAT. EXPERTS BLOG (Aug. 11, 2016),
https://www.nrdc.org/experts/rob-moore/flood-rebuild-repeat-need-flood-insurancereforms [https://perma.cc/9MCU-BQY5].
6 See David Conrad & Larry Larson, We Already Knew How to Reduce Damage
from Floods. We Just Didn’t Do It, WASH. POST: OUTLOOK (Sept. 1, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/we-already-knew-how-to-reduce-damagefrom-floods-we-just-didnt-do-it/2017/09/01/cc6c4174-8f2a-11e7-8df5c2e5cf46c1e2_story.html?utm_term=.8330be70968a [https://perma.cc/5ZYA-HPNA].
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4131 (2012 & Supp. II 2014); 44 C.F.R. §§ 59.1–80.21
(2017); see also National Flood Insurance Program: Reauthorization Guidance, FED.
EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, (last updated Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.fema.gov/
national-flood-insurance-program/national-flood-insurance-program-reauthorizationguidance [https://perma.cc/3VX7-EH5W]; Mary Williams Walsh, A Broke, and Broken,
Flood Insurance Program, N.Y. TIMES: BUS. DAY (Nov. 4, 2017), https://nyti.ms/
2hFpQsW [https://perma.cc/WK59-UG8X].
8 National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–448, 82 Stat. 572
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4131 (2012 & Supp. II 2014)).
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2012); see also Charles T. Griffith, The National Flood
Insurance Program: Unattained Purposes, Liability in Contract, and Takings, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 727, 728 (1994).
10 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, PRESIDENT’S
BUDGET FY 2018 530 (2018).
11 Id.
12 See infra Part II.
13 See
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-317, REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES HIGH-RISK SERIES: PROGRESS ON MANY HIGH-RISK
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were initially instituted at the program’s inception, as private
insurers had long since pulled out of the flood insurance market
and data was therefore unavailable to put an accurate rate
structure in place.14 Subsidized rates were expected to be
replaced by “actuarially sound” rates after the first twenty-five
years of the program.15 Despite this plan, fifty years later many
policyholders continue to pay discounted rates that do not reflect
their true risk levels.16
These subsidies impose substantial burdens on taxpayers
generally and on the homeowners that appear at first glance to
exclusively benefit from the program. Most directly, subsidies
contribute to the financial insolvency of the program.17 Since the
NFIP “collects less in premiums and surcharges than it shells out
in claims and other expenses,” the program is currently $24.6
billion in debt to the U.S. Department of the Treasury.18 More
indirectly, and perhaps more importantly, subsidized premiums
disguise the actual risk that homeowners face—encouraging
rather than discouraging floodplain development.19 The illusion
that coastal and riverfront properties are safe to develop upon
“ensures that there will be greater dislocation when—not if—that
safety is revealed as illusory.”20 This illusion also requires the
government and taxpayers to bear the risk of inevitable loss. “As
a result of its substantial financial exposure and management
and operations challenges, the program has been on [the
Government Accountability Office] High-Risk List since 2006.”21
Recognizing these problems, Congress undertook efforts to
remove subsidies and bring the program back into solvency with
the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BiggertAREAS, WHILE SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS NEEDED ON OTHERS 619 (Feb. 2017) [hereinafter
GAO–17–317], https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/682765.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG45B5EK]; see also Alexander Lemann, Rolling Back the Tide: Toward an Individual
Mandate for Flood Insurance, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 166, 168 (2015).
14 See Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market
Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 3, 15–16 (2007).
15 See Aparna Kirknel Majmudar, The National Flood Insurance Program:
Maintaining Its Head Above Water, 16 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 183, 195–96 (2009).
16 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-425, FLOOD INSURANCE:
COMPREHENSIVE REFORM COULD IMPROVE SOLVENCY AND ENHANCE RESILIENCE 6 (Apr.
2017) [hereinafter GAO–17–425], http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/684354.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2YVR-S8GC].
17 See Ernest B. Abbott, Flood Insurance and Climate Change: Rising Sea
Levels Challenge the NFIP, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 10, 34–35 (2014).
18 Michelle Cottle, Can Congress Bring the National Flood Insurance Program
Above Water?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 5, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2017/08/congress-flood-insurance/535731/ [https://perma.cc/HZC4-GKBT].
19 See Scales, supra note 14, at 6.
20 Id.
21 GAO-17-317, supra note 13, at 619.
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Waters).22 Biggert-Waters “eliminated subsidized premiums and
adjusted premium rates to reflect actual flood risk.”23 This fiscally
responsible solution was, however, met with opposition from
homeowners who were upset that they were required to pay
higher premiums.24 Under political pressure, Congress quickly
reinstated many of the subsidies within just two years by enacting
the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014.25
Another result of the political pressure to provide a safety
net to homeowners in flood-prone areas is the continued
coverage of repetitive loss properties.26 Although all fifty states
must tolerate some repetitive loss properties, “five states—
Texas, Louisiana, Florida, New York and New Jersey—have
10,000 or more properties that frequently flood.”27 Such
properties include a house in Baton Rouge, Louisiana that is
worth close to $56,000, has flooded over forty times, and has
“accumulated almost $430,000 in flood insurance claims.”28
Another home in “Houston, Texas with an assessed value of
$72,400 . . . has frequently flooded and received over $1 million
in flood insurance payouts.”29 These are just a few shocking
examples of what appears to be a more than anecdotal waste
problem: of the five million properties insured by the NFIP, just
30,000 (.60 percent) “[s]evere [r]epetitive [l]oss [p]roperties” “have
received 10.6 [percent] ($5.5 billion dollars) of all flood insurance
claims since 1978.”30 Nearly half of these property owners have
received insurance benefits exceeding the value of their home.31
22 Biggert-Waters Flood Ins. Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–141, 126
Stat. 916 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2012)); see also
Abbott, supra note 17, at 13.
23 Sarah Fox, This Is Adaptation: The Elimination of Subsidies Under the
National Flood Insurance Program, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 208–09 (2014).
24 See Abbott, supra note 17, at 13–14.
25 See id.; see also Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub.
L. No. 113–89, 128 Stat. 1020 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
(2012 & Supp. II 2014).
26 42 U.S.C. § 4121(a)(7) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘repetitive loss structure’ means a
structure covered by a contract for flood insurance that—(A) has incurred flood-related
damage on [two] occasions, in which the cost of repair, on the average, equaled or
exceeded 25 percent of the value of the structure at the time of each such flood event;
and (B) at the time of the second incidence of flood-related damage, the contract for flood
insurance contains increased cost of compliance coverage.”).
27 Alice C. Hill & Craig Fugate, The Same Houses Flood Every Year and We
Keep Paying For Them, HILL (July 31, 2017, 1:40 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/punditsblog/energy-environment/344607-the-same-houses-flood-every-year-and-we-keeppaying-for [https://perma.cc/E4D7-9FRR].
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Eastman, supra note 5.
31 See id.
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Even more alarming than these statistics is the fact that
owners of severe repetitive loss properties “face no limit on the total
value of payments they may receive or on the number of claims
made.”32 How long can taxpayers be expected to hold up and reweave
a safety net before they take away the tightrope altogether?
This note argues that if NFIP subsidies are here to stay,
then at least in the case of severe repetitive loss properties, the
best course of action is to do just that—give governments the
tools they need to exercise their existing authority to condemn
severe repetitive loss properties and convert them into open
space without relying on voluntary-buyout programs.33 This
approach would achieve the key objectives of the NFIP that
advocates of reform seek. Condemnation34 of severe repetitive
loss properties would preclude development on those properties,
with an added benefit of discouraging floodplain development in
general—a primary goal since the creation of the NFIP.35 This
would not only improve the program’s own financial standing by
reducing the number of claims paid out, but would fulfill
Congress’s objective to “alleviate the economic hardships caused
by unforeseen flood disasters” among individual property
owners.36 Converting these properties into open spaces would
also promote environmental sustainability by enabling the
creation of a buffer zone between storms and the communities.37
Finally, condemnation would promote a better allocation of risk
onto property owners instead of taxpayers.38
Part I of this note provides insight into how the NFIP
operates to mitigate flood damage and defines key terms. Part II
dives into the problems that led private insurers to leave the
market and how those problems persist within the NFIP. Part
III introduces the current system of “voluntary buyouts”—
permissible under the current statute—and assesses some of the
issues that the volitional requirement raises in successfully
protecting the public and the environment from flood hazards.
Hill & Fugate, supra note 27.
Currently, municipalities are not permitted to acquire property using
Hazard Mitigation grants and federal NFIP-related funds unless the property owner
agrees to participate voluntarily. 44 C.F.R. § 80.11(a) (2017).
34 “The determination and declaration that certain property (esp. land) is
assigned to public use, subject to reasonable compensation; the exercise of eminent domain
by a governmental entity.” Condemnation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
35 See 42 U.S.C. § 4001(e) (2012).
36 Powers v. United States, 996 F.2d 1121, 1126 (11th Cir. 1993).
37 See, e.g., Buyout and Acquisition Programs, N.Y. GOVERNOR’S OFF. OF
STORM RECOVERY (GOSR), https://stormrecovery.ny.gov/housing/buyout-acquisitionprograms [https://perma.cc/Y8PB-49CJ] (describing the “natural coastal buffer” created
by converting high-risk property to open space).
38 See Majmudar, supra note 15, at 198.
32

33
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Analyzing the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Part IV
introduces a promising solution to the severe repetitive loss
problem—a new plan of forced removal or “involuntary buyouts,”
implemented by local governments with assistance from federal
hazard mitigation grants. This Part also explores the legal
implications and possible limitations that the plan would face;
namely, how such a plan will balance public purposes against
individual property rights, and how “involuntary buyouts” will
be achieved given the “just compensation” requirement.
I.

A TECHNICAL OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM AND DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS

The administrator of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) is charged with managing the NFIP,39 which
includes, inter alia, setting premium rates,40 identifying floodprone areas, and disseminating up-to-date information to the
public regarding the program.41 These activities are largely
dependent upon the administrator’s preparation of two types of
maps—Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) and the Flood
Hazard Boundary Maps (FHBMs).42 These maps identify “special
flood hazard areas” in which “the land in the flood plain within a
community [is] subject to a 1 percent or greater chance of flooding
in any given year.”43 They delineate the various hazards to be
expected at different elevations within these areas, more
commonly known as “100-year floodplains.”44
Under the NFIP, FEMA offers to insure property owners
within the 100-year floodplain, provided that their community
actively chooses to participate in the program and is able to meet
all of the program’s requirements for floodplain management.45

42 U.S.C. § 4011(a).
Id. § 4015(a).
41 Id. §§ 4101(a), 4020.
42 44 C.F.R. § 64.3(a) (2017).
43 Id. § 59.1.
44 Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of
Private Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 331–32 (2003).
The term “100-year floodplain” often results in confusion, as it leads most average
citizens to believe “that once there has already been such a flood in his area, he is safe
for the next ninety-nine years.” Scales, supra note 14, at 9. This confusion causes many
to underestimate the actual risk of flooding and subsequently results in failure to
purchase flood insurance. Id.
45 See 42 U.S.C. § 4014; Barnhizer, supra note 44, at 331–32; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 4012; 44 C.F.R. §§ 59.22, 60.3; John R. Nolon, Land Use and Climate Change: Lawyers
Negotiating Above Regulation, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 521, 560 (2013) (FEMA “limits the
availability of flood insurance to property owners who build in accordance with local
39
40
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The actual sale of NFIP flood insurance policies is operated
through a public-private partnership known as the “Write-YourOwn (WYO) program,” whereby private property insurers act as
“agents of the federal insurance scheme.”46 Thus, FEMA’s
primary function is to create the aforementioned maps, which
determine the premium rates for properties within the floodplain,
and communicate risk to property owners.47 Despite the vital
nature of this responsibility and the support FEMA receives in
carrying out other aspects of the program, most of FEMA’s maps
remain “woefully outdated.”48 For example, the data contained in
flood maps available after Hurricane Sandy hit New York in 2012
were nearly thirty years out of date.49 FEMA’s failure to reliably
update essential maps has imposed another burden on the NFIP,
leading to misrepresentations of the true risks of living in the
floodplain, and contributing to the “continual development and
redevelopment in risky flood-prone areas.”50
Finally, FEMA specifically defines a repetitive loss
property as “[a]n NFIP-insured structure that has had at
least [two] paid flood losses of more than $1,000 each in any [ten]year period since 1978.”51 These properties face no limit on the
number or value of flood insurance claims they may submit,52 and
roughly “[one] in [ten] homes . . . have cumulative . . . claims that
have exceeded the value of the house.”53 A “Severe Repetitive Loss
Building” is a building that is covered under an NFIP policy that:
Has incurred flood damage for which: a. [four] or more separate claim
payments have been made . . . with the amount of each such claim
exceeding $5,000, and with the cumulative amount of such claims
zoning prescriptions that regulate development in Special Flood Hazard Areas
designated by FEMA Flood Insurance Rate Maps.”).
46 Scales, supra note 14, at 14. The name WYO is a misnomer: “the insurance
contract is written by the NFIP and published in the Federal Register. No deviations are
permitted . . . . Insurance companies retain 30% of premiums as a commission . . . [and] are
responsible for enrolling policyholders, collecting premiums, and administering claims.” Id.
47 See Becky Hayat & Robert Moore, Addressing Affordability and Long-Term
Resiliency Through the National Flood Insurance Program, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10338,
10341 (2015).
48 Id.
49 Id. at 10338, 10341 (“[A]t the time Hurricane Sandy hit, the data used to
generate flood maps for New York City had not been updated since they were first issued
in 1983.”).
50 Id. at 10341.
51 Definitions, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (Nov. 30, 2017, 12:11 PM), https://
www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program/definitions#R
[https://perma.cc/W8YJRD45].
52 Hill & Fugate, supra note 27.
53 RAWLE O. KING, R42850, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM: STATUS AND REMAINING ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 20 (2013),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42850.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y379-XVAS].
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payments exceeding $20,000; or b. at least [two] separate claims
payments have been made . . . with the cumulative amount of such
claim payments exceed[ing] the fair market value of the insured
building on the day before each loss.54

The particularly risk-inclined properties that fit these
descriptions, given their rising prevalence and the heavy
financial burden that they impose on the NFIP, are ideal
candidates for a system of “involuntary buyouts.”55
II.

HOW PRIVATE MARKET PROBLEMS BECAME TAXPAYER
PROBLEMS

At one time, homeowners were able to easily obtain
coverage for flooding within the private insurance market.56
Flooding was frequently covered as an additional risk under fire
insurance policies—the dominant form of personal property
insurance until the rise of the modern homeowners’ policy in the
1950s—and could also be covered by more general accident
policies.57 Some features inherent to flood risks, however, made
it an “unattractive [product] for private insurers.”58 In fact, the
issues facing private insurers in providing flood insurance led
the insurers to discontinue such coverage altogether by the midtwentieth century.59 Specifically, problems related to correlated
losses, adverse selection, and moral hazard, led to the demise of
private flood insurance, and despite the best efforts of the federal
government, continue to plague the NFIP.60
A.

Correlated Losses

Perhaps the most destabilizing factor for private
insurers’ ability to cover flooding and other catastrophic risk was
the problem of correlated losses.61 Unlike casualty losses such as
54 Definitions, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (last updated Nov. 20, 2017),
https://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program/definitions#S [https://perma.cc/
JS2X-YUXM]. The term “Severe Repetitive Loss Property” also refers to “a severe
repetitive loss building or the contents within a severe repetitive loss building, or both.”
Id.; see also 44 C.F.R. § 79.2(h).
55 See Eastman, supra note 5.
56 See Scales, supra note 14, at 7.
57 See id. at 7, n.14 (2007).
58 Id. at 7.
59 See Lemann, supra note 13, at 179.
60 See Scales, supra note 14, at 8–11.
61 See James Ming Chen, Correlation, Coverage, and Catastrophe: The
Contours of Financial Preparedness for Disaster, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 56, 65
(2014). “Highly correlated catastrophic risks inflict ‘numerous losses . . . simultaneously
from a single event.’” Id. at 66 (omission in original) (quoting Michael J. Trebilcock &
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car accidents or fires, “losses due to flood[ing] . . . tend to be highly
correlated within geographic areas.”62 Even where the risk of
flooding in a given year is low, when one property is inundated, it
is exceedingly likely that thousands of others in the same area
will be similarly affected.63 The prospect of paying out large
amounts in insurance benefits to a large, narrow distribution of
insureds leads insurers to seek additional capital to protect
themselves financially.64 Finding it difficult to spread risk evenly
among policyholders, private insurers instead made the collective
decision to stop providing flood insurance altogether.65
The government occupies a unique position to mitigate
the costs of correlated losses. Unlike a typical private insurer,
the government does not have to rely exclusively on premium
dollars to cover losses.66 For example, the authorizing statute
includes provisions establishing the possibility of reinsurance by
the private insurance industry.67 Moreover, the statute
established a National Flood Insurance Fund, allowing the NFIP
to borrow taxpayer funds directly from the Treasury to cover
flood losses.68 Having greater potential sources of funding does
not, however, change the concentration of losses incurred.
Despite the ability to access taxpayer funds to cover losses, the
NFIP’s community buy-in and local floodplain management
encourage
development
rather
than
requirements69
abandonment, and cause further concentration and correlation
of losses rather than wider distribution.70
B.

Adverse Selection

Another factor that led to the private insurance
industry’s collective decision to leave the flood insurance market
Ronald J. Daniels, Rationales and Instruments for Government Intervention in Natural
Disasters, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 89, 93 (Ronald
J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006).
62 Scales, supra note 14, at 10–11.
63 See Lemann, supra note 13, at 178.
64 See Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, Climate Change,
Insurability of Large-Scale Disasters, and the Emerging Liability Challenge, 155 U. PA.
L. REV. 1795, 1825 (2007).
65 See Lemann, supra note 13, at 179.
66 See Saul Jay Singer, Flooding the Fifth Amendment: The National Flood
Insurance Program and the “Takings” Clause, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 323, 328 (1990).
67 42 U.S.C. § 4051(a)(2) (2012).
68 42 U.S.C. § 4017(a) (2012 & Supp. II 2014).
69 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4012(c), 4022 (2012) (discussing the NFIP’s statutory
community buy-in and floodplain management requirements); see also 44 C.F.R. § 59.22
(2017) (discussing NFIP community eligibility requirements adopted by FEMA).
70 See Scales, supra note 14, at 13.
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was a problem known as adverse selection.71 It occurs when
those purchasing insurance “have more accurate information on
the probability of a loss than the firms selling coverage.”72 In the
flood insurance context, it occurs when “[t]he people most likely
to buy insurance against flood losses are also the most likely to
suffer [flood losses].”73 Insurers believe that such adverse
selection leads to “death spirals”—situations in which insurance
pools attract riskier customers (who get a good deal covering
likely risk), and deter less risky customers (who choose not to
overpay).74 When these pools overfill with a homogenous block of
high-risk customers who cannot afford actuarially sound
premiums, the insurance pools collapse.75 The risk of adverse
selection initially discouraged the insurance industry from
providing private flood insurance, and has kept them out of the
market since the government entered.76
The NFIP aims to avoid issues of adverse selection in part
by mandating coverage for properties within 100-year
floodplains.77 Yet this mandate is limited in scope.78 Mandatory
coverage applies only to properties within the 100-year
floodplain in participating communities that are acquired or
developed with the assistance of a mortgage from a federally
regulated lending institution.79 Further, even though these
institutions have both a statutory and a rational incentive to
require the lender mandate, “enforcement is often lax.”80 The
lender mandate may incrementally widen the risk pool and
proportionally decrease the likelihood of a “death spiral,” but it
does not do much to expand participation to residents beyond
the already risky 100-year floodplain.81 Even with the lender
mandate in place, the NFIP continues to suffer an adverse
selection problem, in which “[t]he low rate of market penetration
strongly suggests that primarily the highest-risk property
See id. at 8.
Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 64, at 1824; see also Scales, supra
note 14, at 8 (“Adverse selection occurs when insureds know more about their risk
profiles than their insurers.”).
73 Scales, supra note 14, at 8.
74 See id. at 8–9.
75 Id.
76 See id. at 9.
77 42 U.S.C. § 4012a (2012 & Supp. II 2014); see also Barnhizer, supra note 44, at 335.
78 See Lemann, supra note 13, at 198.
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a; Lemann, supra note 13, at 197.
80 Lemann, supra note 13, at 198. This is partially due to mortgage originator’s
ability to quickly receive credit and to pass risk on to the secondary mortgage market.
See Scales, supra note 14, at 18–19.
81 Lemann, supra note 13, at 199 (“[O]utside the 100-year flood zone, the
NFIP’s market penetration is estimated to be only about 1 percent.”).
71

72
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owners opt in and stay in the program.”82 While adverse selection
is a problematic factor that leads to high-risk pools of insureds,
it is not the only one that leads to this result.
C.

Moral Hazard

Closely related to adverse selection, moral hazard also
concerns “the asymmetry of information.”83 The term refers to
“the notion that individuals will engage in cost-increasing
behavior if they are able to shift some of the cost away from
themselves.”84 Simply stated, if an insurance company has agreed
to pay for the consequences, then the insured party has a much
higher incentive to “engage in risky behavior.”85 Reduction of
moral hazard depends upon the insurer’s ability to share costs
with the insured (frequently through co-pays and deductibles)
and to monitor the insured’s behavior.86
In the context of flood insurance, moral hazard issues are
raised where individuals choose to store possessions and
construct or maintain homes in more risky ways, knowing that
potential losses will be covered by insurance.87 Frequently, “the
NFIP stokes moral hazard by underpricing insurance,
encouraging over development in flood-prone areas.”88 “[T]he
extent of repetitive loss . . . as well as the concentration of
coverage in high-risk areas” further suggests that policyholders
“strategically engage in less careful behavior”—epitomizing the
NFIP’s moral hazard problem.89 The issue of moral hazard is one
that private insurers refused to tolerate, but continues to plague
the government program.90
Barnhizer, supra note 44, at 333–34.
Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 64, at 1822.
84 Charlene Luke & Aviva Abramovsky, Managing the Next Deluge: A Tax
System Approach to Flood Insurance, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 27 (2011); see also Wausau
Underwriters Ins. v. United Plastics Grp., 512 F.3d 953, 959 (7th Cir. 2008).
85 See Chen, supra note 61, at 64.
86 See Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 84, at 27–28.
87 See id. at 28–29.
88 Ike Brannon & Ari Blask, Reforming the National Flood Insurance Program:
Toward Private Flood Insurance, 817 POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 1 (2017), https://
www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/reforming-national-flood-insurance-programtoward-private-flood [https://perma.cc/M2V4-DBB5]; see also Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., The
Flurry of Tax Law Changes Following the 2005 Hurricanes: A Strategy for More
Predictable and Equitable Tax Treatment of Victims, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 799, 807 (2007).
89 Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 84, at 30; see also LastWeekTonight,
Floods: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO), Y OUT UBE (Oct. 29, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pf1t7cs9dkc [https://perma.cc/G98G-HPQT] (discussing
instances of individuals choosing to purchase or build beach houses in risky areas because a
“federal program guaranteed [the] investment”).
90 See Scales, supra note 14, at 13.
82
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VOLUNTARY-BUYOUT PROGRAMS

Government acquisition of high-risk land is the most
effective way that a community can decrease the likelihood of
exacerbating the inevitably high premiums and frequent flood
losses that accompany correlated loss, adverse selection, and moral
hazard. High-risk land acquisition also ensures that properties in
particularly hazardous areas are used in ways that reasonably
comport with the nature of disaster risk.91 To carry on such
acquisition efforts, FEMA provides state and local governments
with funding opportunities targeted at property acquisition for
flood hazard mitigation purposes.92 More specifically, FEMA’s
Hazard Mitigation Assistance Program provides federal funds to
states to share the cost of property acquisition projects which will
“substantially reduce the risk of future damage, hardship, loss or
suffering resulting from a major disaster.”93
States may also receive assistance from the Department
of Housing and Urban Development’s Community Development
Block Grant Disaster Recovery Program.94 It is left to state and
local governments to identify eligible properties, prepare grant
applications, and submit them to FEMA on behalf of willing
homeowners.95 “If FEMA approves, it can provide up to 75
[percent] of the funding needed by the state or local government
to purchase the damaged property, and the state or municipal
government must fund the remaining 25 [percent]. The damaged
property will be purchased at its pre-disaster fair market
value.”96 After the transaction is fulfilled, the local government
entity takes title and razes the land.97
Flood-prone properties acquired with hazard mitigation
funds are subjected to various restrictive covenants limiting the
scope of governmental and public activities permitted on the
land. These covenants are essential to furthering the program’s
public policy goals of reducing property damage and loss after

91 See Anna K. Schwab & David J. Brower, Increasing Resilience to Natural
Hazards: Obstacles and Opportunities for Local Governments Under the Disaster
Mitigation Act of 2000, in DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 404, 406
(Wolters Kluwer ed., 3d ed., 2015) [hereinafter DISASTER LAW AND POLICY].
92 See 44 C.F.R. §§ 80.1, 206.434 (2017) (describing the requirements for
property acquisition under the NFIP and eligibility requirements for Hazard Mitigation
Program Grants).
93 Id. § 206.434(c)(5); see also id. § 206.432.
94 See Hayat & Moore, supra note 47, at 10343.
95 See id. at 10343–44.
96 Id. at 10344.
97 Id.
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major disasters.98 The most important of these requirements is
that the property must remain “dedicated and maintained in
perpetuity for uses compatible with open space, recreational, or
wetlands management practices.”99
These “[v]oluntary buyout programs—in which local
governments purchase flood-damaged homes located in highrisk areas and then subsidize the residents’ relocation to safer
grounds—have been conducted across the country.”100 One
particularly ambitious and successful program of this nature is
New York’s Buyout and Acquisitions Program,101 which is
considered “the largest residential buyout scheme ever
attempted in the United States.”102 Created in the wake of
Superstorm Sandy, Hurricane Irene, and Tropical Storm Lee,
the New York State program takes a “ground-up approach;”
working in conjunction with individual homeowners, as well as
county and local government officials to convert those areas
“that regularly put homes, residents and emergency responders
at high risk due to repeated flooding,” into “natural coastal
buffer[s] to safeguard against future storms.”103 Just one
example of the program’s success can be found in the Oakwood
Beach neighborhood of Staten Island. There, the state purchased
nearly 300 dilapidated homes for $122 million, has already
demolished nearly two-thirds of that inventory, and in the
process has “[left] behind a haven for foraging mammals, birds,
insects and plants, with no apex predators in sight.”104
But these buyout programs are not limited only to
densely populated, metropolitan areas like New York City. For
example, “the village of Gays Mills, [Wisconsin,] with a
population of approximately 500 people,” used a combination of
various funding sources “to pull together and relocate
[businesses and private residences in] their community out of a
floodplain . . . [a]fter two 500-year flood events within [ten]

44 C.F.R. § 206.434(e)(1)(i)–(iii).
Id. § 206.434(e)(1)(i).
100 Hayat & Moore, supra note 47, at 10343.
101 See id.; Buyout and Acquisition Programs, supra note 37.
102 DISASTER LAW AND POLICY, supra note 91, at 444.
103 Buyout and Acquisition Programs, supra note 37.
104 Nathan Kensinger, Four Years After Sandy, Staten Island’s Shoreline is
Transformed, CURBED N.Y. (Oct. 27, 2016, 12:57 PM), https://ny.curbed.com/2016/10/27/
13431288/hurricane-sandy-staten-island-wetlands-climate-change [https://perma.cc/3GHBMML3].
98
99
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months.”105 Clearly, buyouts are considered a viable solution to
the prospect of flooding in large and small communities alike.
Despite the relative success of programs in Oakwood
Beach and Gays Mills, however, the hard data reveals that only
a small percentage of eligible owners choose to relocate after
suffering significant flood losses.106 Indeed, “[p]articipation rates
in buyout programs have historically been very low.”107 One
reason that so few individuals buy-in to buyouts is the slow pace
of the transaction.108 Typically lasting three to four years, the
buyout process requires property owners to overcome numerous
and time-consuming administrative hurdles during the
application process, and prices out participants without the
financial capacity to complete the lengthy transaction.109 This
leaves frustrated applicants buried in paperwork long after
applications are sent and houses are re-flooded.110
Another contributor to the relative infrequency of
buyouts is the federal government’s muted enthusiasm for
investing in such programs.111 Federal funding allocated toward
all “strategies for reducing the consequences of flooding (which
include [voluntary buyouts]) was [only] about 5 [percent] of total
disaster relief funds between 2004 and 2012.”112 In addition to
low participation rates and minimal federal assistance, Hazard
Mitigation Grants—sources of funding provided by FEMA to
state and local governmental entities after a disaster declaration
to reduce the impact of future catastrophic events—is available
only to those projects in which property owners participate
voluntarily.113 States are explicitly restricted from using eminent
domain powers to acquire property using Hazard Mitigation
Grants.114 Thus, state and local efforts to acquire property
105 Robert R.M. Verchick & Lynsey R. Johnson, When Retreat Is the Best Option:
Flood Insurance After Biggert-Waters and Other Climate Change Puzzles, 47 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 695, 702 (2013).
106 Hayat & Moore, supra note 47, at 10343 (“It is estimated that only 10–15
[percent] of the 11,300 qualifying homeowners will ultimately accept a buyout
offer. Contrast these numbers with the approximately 161,000 NFIP claims filed as a result
of Superstorm Sandy in 2012 and Hurricane Irene and Tropical Storm Lee in 2011, and
one can see just how few residents relocate in the wake of a flood.” (citations omitted)).
107 Id.
108 See id.
109 See id. at 10343–44.
110 See Walsh, supra note 7.
111 See Hayat & Moore, supra note 47, at 10343.
112 Id. (citations omitted).
113 See Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Overview, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT.
AGENCY (last updated June 8, 2017), https://www.fema.gov/hazard-mitigation-grantprogram [https://perma.cc/K5KZ-CBAF]; see also 44 C.F.R. § 80.11(a) (2017).
114 44 C.F.R. § 80.11(a).
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through requisite voluntary transactions can therefore be
frustrated by “holdout problems” and situations where the
owners of property cannot be located.115
Further, while forming partnerships and working
cooperatively with landowners are theoretically ideal, in practice
those strategies can be difficult to rely upon when dealing with
the uncertain nature of flood risk mitigation policy.116 Indeed, as
has been revealed by the enormity of the repetitive loss problem,
property owners in even the riskiest areas often choose to rebuild
rather than relocate.117 Why take a buyout when you can
comfortably rebuild as many times as you would like?
IV.

EXERCISING EMINENT DOMAIN TO ACQUIRE FLOODPRONE PROPERTIES IN A SYSTEM OF “INVOLUNTARY
BUYOUTS”

Governments are more likely to use voluntary buyouts and
other “arms-length transactions” for hazard mitigation-related
land acquisition than other methods because they are frequently
faster and “more politically acceptable.”118 Nevertheless, if the
federal government extended funding toward programs that
acquire flood-prone property by eminent domain in a system of
“involuntary buyouts,” state and local governments would be
better equipped to solve the problems associated with repetitive
loss properties and to achieve the policy goals of the NFIP.
A.

The Fifth Amendment Provides Broad Constitutional
Authority for the Institution of “Involuntary Buyouts”

The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides that
private property shall not “be taken for public use without just
compensation.”119 “[C]ommonly referred to as the ‘Takings
Clause,’ ‘Eminent Domain Clause,’ and the ‘Just Compensation
Clause,’”120 the amendment, at its most fundamental level,
stands for the proposition that “[w]hen the government
DISASTER LAW AND POLICY, supra note 91, at 413.
See Blake Hudson, Coastal Land Loss and the Mitigation-Adaptation
Dilemma: Between Scylla and Charybdis, 73 LA. L. REV. 31, 62 (2012).
117 Hill & Fugate, supra note 27.
118 DISASTER LAW AND POLICY, supra note 91, at 413.
119 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provisions regarding takings
are applied to the states via the Fourteenth amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
120 Daryn McBeth, Public Need and Private Greed—Environmental Protection
and Property Rights, 1 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 112, 112 n.1 (1996).
115
116
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physically takes possession of an interest in property for some
public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the
former owner.”121 Such a taking occurs when the government
physically occupies a property permanently122 or when a regulation
requires the owner of a property to permanently sacrifice all of the
“economically beneficial uses of his or her land.”123
Through its takings jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
has granted significant legal authority to the government to take
property for public purposes, provided that it deliver “just
compensation” for the taking.124 This broad legal authority is
enabled by the Court’s expansive definition of the term “public
purpose,” and its deference to legislative judgments in
determining which purposes justify the exercise of eminent
domain.125 For example, in Kelo v. City of New London, Conn.,
the Court deferred to legislative judgment in upholding
economic development as a valid public purpose justifying the
use of eminent domain.126 The Court’s decision permitted the
City of New London, after purchasing land from willing sellers
to promote economic development, to acquire the remaining
tracts of land from “unwilling owners” in the area through
eminent domain in exchange for just compensation.127 Indeed,
this taking was considered permissible despite the fact that
private individuals would benefit from the taking.128 Kelo is a
quintessential example of the government’s broad constitutional
authority to take private property against the wishes of the
owner, so long as the government provides just compensation.129
121 Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31 (2012)
(alteration in original) (quoting Tahoe–Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002)).
122 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982) (“A permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking, without
regard to the public interests it may serve.”).
123 Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n, 568 U.S. at 32 (citing Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992)).
124 See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) (“Judicial
deference is required because, in our system of government, legislatures are better able
to assess what public purposes should be advanced by an exercise of the taking power.”).
125 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480–83 (2005).
126 Id. at 480–85.
127 Id. at 472.
128 See id. at 486.
129 Despite this broad power, rising political opposition in the wake of Kelo has
led to state level limitations on the exercise of eminent domain power, especially in cases
where private parties inure a benefit from government takings. DISASTER LAW AND
POLICY, supra note 91, at 421. Some argue that these state level restrictions wind up
reducing economic-development takings, in addition to slowing recovery efforts after
natural disasters. Id. (citing Frank S. Alexander, Louisiana Land Reform in the Storm’s
Aftermath, 53 LOY. L. REV. 727 (2007)).
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Given this broad authority to determine public purposes,
Congress can use its power under the Takings Clause to address
the problems caused by severe repetitive loss properties. “The
Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be
taken for a public use without just compensation was designed
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.”130 In cases of repetitive and severe repetitive
loss properties, the reverse occurs—the wholly private burden of
flood damage is unfairly borne by the public as a whole, over and
over again.131 By condemning private, high-risk properties using
the power of eminent domain, effectively initiating an
“involuntary buyout,” government actors on the federal, state,
and local level can prevent redevelopment to mitigate inevitable
flood damage, avoid the persistent problems of correlated loss,
adverse selection, and moral hazard, and properly allocate the
burdens of flood damage.
First, as is the case under voluntary-buyout programs,
property acquisition through eminent domain would provide
governments with another tool to transform hazardous
properties “into wetlands, open space, or storm-water
management systems, creating a natural . . . buffer to safeguard
against future storms.”132 Such buffers would improve the
physical resiliency of the land itself in the wake of disaster,133
and would reduce the concentration of flood-prone properties
that leads to correlated losses.134 Further, an increased ability to
acquire flood-prone land through eminent domain would provide
a disincentive to the redevelopment of repetitive loss properties,
and would ensure that there will be less dislocation of
individuals and families when the next storm inevitably
comes.135 Indeed, the threat alone of possible takings might more
adequately discourage floodplain redevelopment than current
efforts and help to reduce the correlated loss problem.136
Adverse selection can lead to a “death-spiral,” “in which
those who perceive themselves to face lower flood risk drop out
of the program, leaving behind an ever-riskier pool of
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
See Eastman, supra note 5; Hill & Fugate, supra note 27.
132 Buyout and Acquisition Programs, supra note 37.
133 See id.
134 See Scales, supra note 14, at 6.
135 See id. (“By creating the illusion that alluvial and coastal plains can be made
safe for development, government policy ensures that there will be greater dislocation
when—not if—that safety is revealed as illusory.”).
136 Id. at 42–43.
130
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policyholders.”137 Under an “involuntary buyout” program for
repetitive loss properties, however, the riskiest properties would be
those leaving the program, rather than the less risky. By acquiring
parcels via eminent domain, razing them, and prohibiting their
redevelopment, state and local governments would remove those
properties from the NFIP’s risk pool. Removing those properties
from the risk pool, and creating a coastal buffer in their place to
reduce the risk to nearby properties, could drive down the
actuarial rate of premiums, in turn improving the financial
stability of the program as a whole and providing affordable
coverage for those who still face some marginal risk.
Finally, providing greater opportunities for states to
advance “involuntary buyouts” of repetitive loss properties
would give the government greater ability to discourage the
intolerable moral hazard typified by repetitive loss properties.138
Rather than continue a repetitive loss-owner’s expectation of
continual bailouts and taxpayer-funded redevelopment in the
wake of disaster, a strong system of involuntary buyouts would
incentivize owners to self-protect or relocate.139 Holdouts who
choose to stay in previously designated repetitive loss properties
under such a system would be bought out at post-disaster prices.
Knowing the consequences of living and redeveloping on such a
risky parcel, those property owners would thereby properly bear
the burdens on such redevelopment, and would receive less
compensation than those who relocated at initial signs of danger.
Further, such a system would permit the government to end the
frustrating cycle of inevitable destruction and subsidized
redevelopment with a single exercise of eminent domain.
B.

Balancing Private Property Interests with Public
Concerns

Extending the use of eminent domain and funding
“involuntary buyouts” would help to mitigate the effects of natural
disasters themselves, as well as many of the sources of the NFIP’s
financial and moral problems. Given the sacrosanct status that
private property rights have frequently enjoyed throughout the
history of the United States, the decision to embrace eminent
domain in the name of flood mitigation will, however, likely be met

137
138
139

Lemann, supra note 13, at 205.
See Scales, supra note 14, at 12.
See Abbott, supra note 17, at 27.
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with political opposition.140 Nevertheless, an examination of the
Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence shows that while revered,
private property rights are not absolute.141
The right to own property is considered by many as a
fundamental human right, that is “essential to individual liberty
and . . . a birthright of every American.”142 The ability to freely
own land was important for the early settlement [of] the
American colonies,143 and was later deemed essential by the
framers of the United States, who viewed property ownership as
a crucial aspect of personal liberty and security.144 In light of this
revered position, restrictions placed on private property rights
have long been viewed as controversial and unfair violations of
owners’ constitutional rights.145 For example, critics of the NFIP
have said that “[i]t would be hard to find a program which cuts
against more fundamental grains: freedom to choose where to
live and build, freedom from government restriction (the federal
government, at that), and freedom to maximize a profit from the
land, buyer beware.”146 Of course, the program has invoked the
ire of disgruntled private property owners and property rights
enthusiasts, and has faced (though nevertheless survived) legal
challenges alleging that the program is itself a regulatory
taking.147 It stands to reason that a move toward expanding the
forced relocation of repetitive loss property owners only further
cuts against those “fundamental grains,”148 and would invite
more claims of government overreach.
Despite the reverence that the Framers had—that the
nation continues to have—for private property rights, owners of
property do not receive “unfettered discretion” when they obtain
140 See Jonathan Jorissen, Note, Katrina’s House: The Constitutionality of the
Forced Removal of Citizens from Their Homes in the Wake of Natural Disasters, 5 AVE
MARIA L. REV. 587, 605 (2007) (“From the very beginning of this country, private
property has been revered.”).
141 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (noting that
“the right of the owner to use his land is not absolute”); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629 (2001) (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992)).
142 Steven J. Eagle, The Development of Property Rights in America and the
Property Rights Movement, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 78 (2002).
143 See id. at 82.
144 See id. at 83–84.
145 See Mark W. Cordes, Property Rights and Land Use Controls: Balancing
Private and Public Interest, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 629 (1999).
146 Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and
Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 159 (1985).
147 See Texas Landowners Rights Ass’n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025, 1031
(D.D.C. 1978), aff’d, 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
148 Houck, supra note 146, at 159.
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title to land; instead, “the rights are subordinate to the good of
society.”149 Indeed, “[o]ur nation . . . has long recognized that
private property interests are limited by public needs.”150 State
governments are able to determine “the good of society” and “public
needs” by exercising “valid police power” to provide for “the best
interest of the health, morals, safety, and welfare of the public.”151
States can and frequently do exercise police power by
passing land-use regulations that “substantially advance
legitimate state interests.”152 Such valid state actions are not
considered regulatory takings.153 The proposed system of
involuntary buyouts, however, would entail categorical
takings—the government physically occupying property,
requiring just compensation.154 Nevertheless, courts have
determined that “the right to use land should be carefully
measured against the environment’s capacity to tolerate such a
use and the extent of harm which the proposed use would impose
upon the established and proper use of neighboring lands.”155
While the relationship between public and private interests in
land is rife with tension, the law does not recognize an absolute
power of one over the other.156
In the case of repetitive loss properties, the government
has a particularly strong interest in reversing the negative
environmental and economic impact that these properties have
had on their respective communities.157 The benefits of
converting these properties from known physical risks and
drains on the financial stability of the flood insurance program
into open space barriers that protect the surrounding
community, outweigh the abstract interest in liberty and
personal security.158 Indeed, forced retreat from repetitive loss
McBeth, supra note 120, at 116.
Cordes, supra note 145, at 643.
151 Id.; McBeth, supra note 120, at 117; see also Mayor, Aldermen &
Commonalty of the City of N.Y. v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 103 (1837) (holding that “[a]ll those
powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or which may more properly be
called internal police, are not surrendered or restrained; and consequently, in relation to
these the authority of a state is complete, unqualified, and exclusive.”).
152 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); see Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987).
153 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n, 480 U.S. at 471.
154 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 322 (2002).
155 Usdin v. State, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Div. of Water Res., 414 A.2d 280, 289
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980), aff’d, 430 A.2d 949 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
156 See Cordes, supra note 145, at 638.
157 See supra Section IV.A; see also Kensinger, supra note 104 (discussing the
positive environmental impacts of buyouts and retreat).
158 See Eagle, supra note 142, at 83–84.
149

150
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properties would improve the security of owners by removing
them from known flood risks.159 Further, while the fundamental
liberty interests of property owners are in part broken by forced
removal, the government is able to provide owners with
opportunities to move elsewhere and make owners whole by
providing just compensation.
C.

Just Compensation in the Wake of Disaster: Affording
Involuntary Buyouts

Understanding how the government will afford to provide
“just compensation” as required by the Takings Clause is
essential to any adoption of an “involuntary buyouts” system.160
Under the current system, FEMA is permitted to provide up to
75 percent of the funds required to purchase flood-damaged
property in voluntary transactions, with other government
entities contributing the remainder.161 In New York, “the state
agrees to purchase homes in areas of ‘highest risk’ for 100
percent of pre-storm fair market value . . . . For eligible homes
in areas of lower risk, the state will pay the post-storm [fair
market value] with added incentives.”162 In order to expand the
buyout system to include eminent domain acquisitions, state
and local governments must consider any possible discounts that
might make the program more affordable, as well as the external
economic effects that the program will have on the state.
The recognition of “government givings” and the
implementation of a “givings recapture mechanism” would make
it easier for the government to provide just compensation to
property owners.163 The concept of “givings” contemplates an
inverse of conventional takings, which occurs when government
acts enhance the value of private property.164 Givings are
effected through a multitude of government programs, ranging
from the complex farm subsidy programs and homeowner’s
mortgage tax deductions, to the relatively simple programs, such
as paving of roads and providing municipal sewer systems.165
Regardless of how they take shape, judicial recognition of
See Verchick & Johnson, supra note 105, at 698.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
161 See Hayat & Moore, supra note 47, at 10344.
162 DISASTER LAW AND POLICY, supra note 91, at 444 (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted).
163 Barnhizer, supra note 44, at 298 (emphasis omitted).
164 McBeth, supra note 120, at 131 n.100 (citing 141 Cong. Rec. H2497 (daily
ed. Mar. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Schroeder)).
165 See Cordes, supra note 145, at 647; see also McBeth, supra note 120, at 130.
159

160
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givings would ensure that taxpayers do not pay twice in takings
cases.166 Most relevant is that substantial government givings
can be recognized in the NFIP’s provision of subsidized flood
insurance rates.167 In his proposal for a “givings recapture
mechanism” for properties improved by the implementation of
the NFIP, Professor Daniel Barnhizer relies on the Court’s
interpretation of the “just compensation clause.”168 The clause,
Barnhizer notes, “permits the government to offset or avoid
compensating landowners for value increments created directly
by government action.”169 According to Barnhizer:
Rather than continuing to provide flood insurance at below-market
rates, the NFIP should be amended to recognize explicitly the value of
its rate subsidies to individual insureds and treat that amount as a
credit to offset the cost of the federal government’s future purchase of
redevelopment rights or other property rights from those insureds.
This givings recapture mechanism would permit coastal landowners
to maximize use of their properties until they suffer catastrophic flood
losses, would compensate landowners fully for their property upon
condemnation or purchase by the government, and could sidestep
political opposition to restrictive regulation of coastal floodplain land
use.170

By accounting for givings, Barnhizer’s plan could stretch
the value of Hazard Mitigation Grants and enable the
government to initiate more buyouts. Application of such a
“givings recapture mechanism” under the current statute would
likely be similarly limited to voluntary buyouts.171 Further, since
the federal government is the actor providing subsidized
insurance and thus effectuating the giving, such a mechanism
might not grant much independence to state and local
governments in acquiring risky properties. Thus, an expansion
of the current statute to provide federal dollars for state and
local takings would help to guarantee the fruitful application of
a “givings recapture mechanism.”
Even if the statute is not expanded to grant federal
money to states, there is still some room for state and local
independence in applying such a mechanism. For example,
states and local communities provide some of the givings
See McBeth, supra note 120, at 131 n.100 (citing 141 Cong. Rec. H2497).
See Barnhizer, supra note 44, at 298.
168 Id.; see also United States v. Miller 317 U.S. 369, 376–77 (1943) (holding
that property owners are not entitled to enhanced compensation for the value of their
condemned property that is directly attributable to Government activities).
169 Barnhizer, supra note 44, at 298.
170 Id.
171 See 44 C.F.R. § 80.11(a) (2017).
166

167
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discussed above such as roads and sewers, which might be
accounted for in affording just compensation.172 Further, NFIP
communities under the current system frequently elect to
implement additional flood mitigation measures beyond the bare
minimum, in a subsection of the program known as the
Community Rating System (CRS).173 While the CRS is generally
intended to generate discounted NFIP-premium rates within
participating communities,174 those heightened floodplain
management practices implemented on the local level might also
be considered as community givings, thus permitting
proportionally less expensive takings. If implemented, many
communities would be able to take advantage of such a system,
since CRS has been adopted by 1,200 communities, comprising
“approximately 67 percent of [all] policyholders.”175 Regardless of
the entity that provides the giving, the use of a “givings
recapture mechanism” would likely help governments a great
deal in affording and implementing the systematic
condemnation of repetitive loss properties.
The economic impact on the community within which the
government exercises the “involuntary buyout” system is critical
to any cost considerations of such program. The current system of
post-flood buyouts often leads to the relocation of entire
neighborhoods, resulting in “lost property tax revenue and
disruption of previous assumptions about community
infrastructure investments.”176 In the eyes of some, buyouts “turn
off the economic engine” of the community, which can have broad
economic impacts on the whole state.177 For example, the decision
to offer and accept buyouts on the Jersey Shore in the wake of
Hurricane Sandy was necessarily evaluated with an eye toward
its renowned summer tourism industry, the associated tax
revenues, and their effects on the state economy as a whole.178
To mitigate the negative tax implications of buyout
programs, some scholars emphasize the benefits of securing
buyout and relocation agreements in advance of the next major
flood event.179 By arranging the buyout before disaster strikes,
See McBeth, supra note 120, at 130; Cordes, supra note 145, at 647.
42 U.S.C. § 4022(b) (2012); see also Lemann, supra note 13, at 185–86.
174 See Lemann, supra note 13, at 185–86.
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Plans in Wake of Sandy, RECORD (BERGEN CTY.), Mar. 15, 2013, in DISASTER LAW AND
POLICY, supra note 91, at 442–44.
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“the local community can assess well in advance how many
properties are going to be taken off the property tax rolls and the
resulting level of demand for municipal services that it will need
to provide post-disaster.”180 In such a situation, though a loss of
revenue may eventually occur, the community has an
opportunity to prepare.181 Another method of mitigating the
negative tax consequences currently utilized is the inclusion of
“incentives for owners who agree to . . . relocate within the
county.”182 For example, New York offers “a 5 percent bonus on
closing if [homeowners] could prove that they would use the
money to purchase another home within the county.”183 Such a
strategy not only promotes the state’s interest in retaining its
tax base, but enhances a homeowners’ opportunity to remain in
the neighborhoods in which they have established themselves,
and reduces the feeling of dislocation that may occur in the wake
of a buyout.
Although these methods have only been employed in
instances of voluntary buyouts, and the former method occurs
pre-disaster, both provide insight into how the negative
economic consequences of involuntary buyouts may be
mitigated. For example, local governments carrying out
involuntary buyouts may, like New York, provide additional
compensation to property owners that agree to relocate within
the same tax area.184 Such advance agreements to cede property
voluntarily and to relocate within a specified geographic area
admittedly may run into enforcement problems.185 Nevertheless,
“in most cases, it is less expensive to buy out [repetitive loss
properties] than it is to cover the cost of repairing and rebuilding
after ever-more-common floods.”186 Indeed, the potential value of
such a system is easy to imagine in the context of those most
problematic properties in risky areas, which continue to receive
coverage and benefits far in excess of the property’s value.187
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CONCLUSION
Flooding and its damage in the wake of natural disasters
is a national problem that continues to worsen as a result of
climate change and sea-level rise.188 As more and more
properties suffer flooding with greater frequency, the number of
severe repetitive loss properties will continue to swell; the
current system will only ensure that those properties are rebuilt
to flood another day.189 State and local governments already
have broad constitutional authority to replace repetitive losses
with natural wetlands and coastal barriers, and to mitigate the
effects of natural disasters using eminent domain.190 What’s
more, the federal government would play a crucial role in
replacing the current system of limitless claims and gross moral
hazard by granting increased funding toward a system of
involuntary buyouts.
It is essential for the federal government to step in and
use the power that it is granted by the Constitution on a local
level to protect the environment and the families living on the
coast. As many commentators are beginning to recognize, “[i]f
we’re going to adapt to climate change without loss of life and
unnecessary financial hardship in Harvey- and Irma-like
storms, federal, state and local governments need to start
financing and encouraging relocation.”191 Although it may be
difficult politically and financially to afford such a sweeping
program that cuts against the fundamental private property
rights of citizens, it is clear from the dangerous and expensive
cycle of flooding and redevelopment that as individuals and as a
nation, we cannot afford not to.
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